What’s Phenomenology? (Half 1: Defining Phenomenology)


Updated on:

What is Phenomenology? (Part 1: Defining Phenomenology)


You can view the original post here

“[Phenomenology] brings into view something with which we are at once deeply intimate but at the same time, of which we are typically neglectful: our own experience.”

– Joel Smith, Experiencing Phenomenology: An Introduction (xiii).

“Without doing phenomenology, it may be practically impossible to understand phenomenology.” “…without entering into the doing, the basic thrust and import of phenomenology is likely to be misunderstood at the least or missed at most.”

– Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology (3, 4).

Phenomenology—from the Greek phenomena + logos—means one thing like an account (logos) of appearances (phenomena).

The Greek phainomenon is derived from phainesthai, which suggests to seem, develop into seen, or present itself. The time period logos is derived from the Greek legein, which suggests ‘to assemble’, ‘to gather’. Within the 200+ historical Greek compound nouns ending in –logos, the time period refers both to (1) this notion of ‘gathering up’ and/or ‘assembly’, or (2) ‘word’ or ‘speech’, forming phrases such s ‘conversation’ or ‘dialogue/discourse’. In both case, the basis (leg, from legein) can convey each meanings, as in ‘gathering up and saying’ and even gathering up after which letting one thing be seen/apprehended/understood/skilled—i.e., making it out there for seeing—by being vocalized or recorded.

Phenomenology isn't involved with questions on a phenomenon’s ontological standing—i.e., what it is or is likely to be “in reality”, past/beneath what/how we expertise it in our lives); phenomenology doesn't presume/search a metaphysical/important substance that lies behind/beneath what's skilled in on a regular basis life, and doesn’t allow these kinds of assumptions to have an effect on taking account of the best way a phenomenon exhibits itself. Equally, Phenomenology can also be not involved with questions on ‘why’ a phenomenon exists (basically or by accident); phenomenology doesn't presume/search any clarification about the reason for the phenomenon, and doesn’t enable these kinds of assumptions to have an effect on taking account of the showing of a phenomenon. The phenomenologist takes account in an effort to reveal (i.e., render seen) the factor that exhibits itself (within the method that it exhibits itself, nonetheless it seems),

In phenomenology, what counts particularly as a phenomenon is something that seems “in” (or “as”) expertise. By expertise, phenomenologists imply one thing fairly exact. The German phrase for this particular factor is Erlebnis, which means “lived experience”. Lived expertise is your on a regular basis, instant expertise. It's your on a regular basis expertise of the ‘real’, the world inside which you end up and inside which you could have your particular person experiences. The phrases of the ‘real’ are usually not one thing that you simply dictated; you can not remodel it at will or ‘turn it off’ (in the best way that you possibly can do flip off or remodel one thing in your creativeness). Your particular person actions are carried out “within” the ‘real’, the latter which you haven't constructed.

Phenomenology desires to offer an account of this—lived expertise. It desires to offer an account of the pure, instant experiencing of some phenomenon by assembling phrases that reveal or disclose this instant expertise as it's skilled—and via this account permits it to be skilled (by one other).


As a way to ‘see’ phenomenologically, it's crucial to instantly orient oneself to ‘lived experience’. With out this direct expertise of that to which ‘lived experience’ is referring, a lot of phenomenology makes little/no sense.

The German time period for ‘lived experience’, Erlebnis, accommodates leben, which suggests ‘to live’. The verb erleben means to ‘live through something’, a definition by which we might find each a side of exercise (a being-active: reside via one thing) and one in all passivity (a being-passive: reside via one thing): lived expertise resides via the [something] given. That is probably the most instant manner by which factor are ‘given’. Phenomenologists use the phrase ‘given’ to explain probably the most primary character of expertise: showing is going on, and this showing (i.e., expertise, or, merely, consciousness) isn't topic to my will. It's thus, they are saying, ‘given’. Lived expertise, in others phrases, is your dwelling via the uninterrupted stream of showing.

Lived expertise isn't sensory expertise. In my on a regular basis, pure, instant life, I don't expertise myself as compiling sensations in an effort to make which means. As a substitute, issues are instantly “meaningful”. Issues seem as ‘always already’ significant—they already ’make sense’ in a primary sufficient manner in order that I'm not disoriented. In different phrases, I’ve already made sense of it in a primary sufficient manner in order that it suits into my instant expertise, even when the best way one thing suits into my instant expertise is as one thing (some particular person factor) that's which meansmuch less/trivial (throughout the bigger background expertise towards which the precise factor is trivial). In different phrases, phenomenological which means isn't constructed by reflective research. It's what's instantly significant as if unmediated. Thinker Max van Manen—in his 2014 guide, Phenomenology of Apply, writes that lived expertise is “…a kind of immediate awareness that is not (yet) aware of itself” (225).


We are able to additional outline extra clearly this notion of ‘lived’ expertise by distinguishing it from accounts of expertise that emerge from ‘reflective’ consciousness. The duty of reflective consciousness is to thematize, set up, conceptualize, theorize, and so on.—i.e., to stabilize and so present conceptual or theoretical readability to the stream of our instant expertise. The duty of phenomenology is to reanimate via description the lived expertise that's previous to this reflection. We'd thus additionally name our ‘lived experience’ one thing like pre-reflective expertise. Let’s use an instance from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (347-9):

Allow us to think about that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I've simply glued my ear to the door and appeared via a keyhole. (…) behind that door a spectacle is introduced as ‘to be seen,’ a dialog as ‘to be heard’. The door, the keyhole are directly each devices and obstacles; they're introduced as ‘to be handled with care’; the keyhole is given as ‘to be looked through close by and a little to one side’, and so on. (…) However abruptly I hear footsteps within the corridor. Somebody is me!

Sartre’s description is of the lived expertise of wanting via a keyhole after which being caught doing so. A keyhole is small, and so one can think about the pains via which one must put oneself to see the spectacle in its spatial entirety (as if it have been on a stage). Voices are possible muffled. There are moments when nothing may be seen, and so he would possibly ‘glue’ his ear to the door to get one thing, something. Sensing motion behind the door—or due merely to impatience, or each—he returns his eye to the opening. His consciousness is totally ‘thrown’ via the keyhole, behind the door… till he hears the footsteps behind him. He turns round. He’s been caught, and in that very immediate feels his consciousness in his very personal flesh.

If we requested Sartre to inform us what occurred, his report can be some variation of “I got caught looking through a keyhole”—which is precisely what occurred. This reporting is formulated reflectively, or wanting again unto the occasion in an effort to present particulars related to the query, “What happened?” From the angle of reflective consciousness—a place which we might describe as ‘objective’ and even ‘third person’—Sartre appeared via the keyhole, tried to see or hear what was occurring behind the door, and was caught. None of that is false.

This reporting, nonetheless, requires adopting fairly a distinct stance on the expertise when in comparison with the expertise he really had of trying to seize what was taking place behind the keyhole. When he was on the keyhole, he was totally absorbed in what was showing, and by no means reflecting self-consciously on the truth that he was experiencing. Phenomenological description should stay at this stage of expertise. Sartre’s description is itself an instance of such a phenomenological description, as a result of it goals exactly to painting the state of affairs because it was lived and never because it subsequently appeared in specific self-reflection. In different phrases, it aimed toward reanimating the expertise because it was skilled.

Discover that Sartre’s feeling-objectified (i.e., his being given himself in being caught) isn't an ‘appearance’ in the best way that, say, an individual seems once they enter a room. On this instance, the looks of the sensation of being objectified ”seems” within the physique, affectively. This specific phenomenon—this specific look—isn't an look that seems to the eyes however is reasonably skilled.

We are able to discover, additional, that the ‘I’ seems in a different way in lived expertise than it does in reflective expertise: within the lived expertise of peering via the keyhole, Sartre’s ‘self’, in a phrase, disappears. In any comparable such expertise—of being engaged in one thing, equivalent to peering and even typing—we usually are usually not explicitly conscious of ourselves. Our consciousness is ‘thrown’ elsewhere—via the keyhole or on the pc display screen whereas typing. My ‘self’ resurfaces once I report that ‘I was looking through the keyhole’ or that ‘I was typing’. In different phrases, it is just in reflective consciousness that each ‘I’ and no matter ‘what’ I used to be doing develop into objects of reflection. In a reflective stance, to the query ‘what are you doing’, I'd reply “I am writing”, however within the act of writing itself—our consideration thrown unto the display screen—the lived expertise itself might maybe be higher described by one thing like “I am writing.” Don Ihde writes in his guide, Experimental Phenomenology (31)—“the phenomenological ‘I’ takes on its significance through its encounter with things, persons, and every type of otherness it may meet”. In different phrases, my ‘self’ is all the time already wrapped up in a world that precedes it, and this pre-reflective, passive having of expertise—this implicit consciousness—is the situation for specific self-awareness (i.e., of my having the ability to say “I”). In but different phrases, there's an implicit consciousness now we have of ourselves whereas explicitly being conscious of some object or state of affairs. Sartre exhibits that consciousness itself isn't an object, per se, however is extra of a taking place. In our on a regular basis, lived expertise, we're all the time conscious of one thing; the precise ‘thing’ might change, however consciousness on the whole, consciousness of one thing—i.e., being wrapped up in one thing that's past oneself—doesn't.

On this case, Sartre was “moved by” jealousy/curiosity/vice. Jealousy/curiosity/vice—none of which he manufactured along with his will—moved or motivated him to reply to a state of affairs that referred to as him to reply in a specific manner. Then, his consideration was referred to as his consideration away from the spectacle behind the door to the “footsteps within the corridor“. In a way, he skilled a type of provocation to—first—search along with his eyes and ears (by the to-be-heard/seen occasion behind the door) and—second—to show round (by the footsteps—the to-be-located—behind his physique). His consideration wasn’t like a highlight; there wasn’t an inside ‘self’ (a disengaged ‘consciousness’ that stood exterior/above his state of affairs) that made the choice to be moved by jealousy/curiosity/vice, however reasonably the state of affairs itself exceeded his particular person will—lets say that it struck him or imposed itself on his will, and this specific imposition made out there the choice to look. The state of affairs, in different phrases, referred to as him to behave in a specific manner. He felt compelled to research—or he was referred to as to research—what was behind the door; he skilled the state of affairs behind the door as compelling (and certain skilled the door itself as an impediment).


Phenomenological description is supposed to reanimate dwelling sense. The target is to make use of phrases to level to a lived expertise that the reader should then expertise him or herself. The phrases, in different phrases, should carry lived expertise to life, and this bringing to life has the impact of manufacturing within the reader a kind of lucid or hanging, im-mediate and unreflective recognition, the sensation of seeing ‘into’ (in-sight) some expertise, of bringing it shut. Its purpose is to ‘show’ prereflective livedness, to impress or evoke it, to kindle or waken—and to not include; to catch and launch, to not seize. The target is vocative one, meant to invoke an expertise or provoke it into showing. Alternatively, we might take into account the target to be an exhortative one, urging the reader to ‘see’ or have a specific expertise. A lot a like a magic spell, the incantation does its work after which disappears; we don't want the phrases any longer as a result of it's executed: the ghost, the impact, has (hopefully) made its look.

It's because the dwelling sense of some expertise can't be mentioned, solely indicated or pointed to. Merely naming a livedness would, in a way, destroy it. Take into account the instance given above. As a substitute of providing this instance, we might have merely named the expertise: getting caught. We'd not be pointing to a living-through, however would reasonably be fixing it, letting the phrase stand in for it, lowering it in an effort to grasp it. The usage of examples in reanimating dwelling sense is paramount as a result of the instance is ready to give voice to (and make knowable) a livedness—the singularity—that isn't straightforwardly nameable or describable. Phenomenological examples level to or point out an expertise in its livedness (i.e., its singularity). The instance—the gathering of phrases—holds in abeyance (or suspends, as if in mid-air), so to talk, a livedness, and lets or not it's seen by one other.

Phenomenology requires one to actively and repeatedly remind oneself that the phrase or phrase is enjoying this ‘invoking’ perform, and isn't a direct or univocal illustration of a set factor (or its metaphysical essence/substance). In different phrases, one should reside the phrases as invoking all the time a livedness or a living-through. Once we develop into habituated to acquainted makes use of of phrases, we are likely to overlook this, and may really think about our phrases to be transparently giving us issues. Within the recurring use of a phrase to face in for a livedness, we might first let the phrases stand in for the factor after which allow them to develop into the factor by not dwelling them as invocations. Such phrases or phrases develop into meaningless. Jacques Derrida—in his article ‘White Mythology’—likened these phrases/ideas to cash whose value-inscriptions had been ‘ground down’ (i.e., used up, indifferent from its particular state of affairs). Consequently, the ‘value’ of those cash (i.e., significance as referring to a livedness) grew to become ‘absolute’ within the sense that it was referring to nothing—a coin with out inscription—and so, in a way, might imply something.

Phenomenology can't do its work as soon as phrases/ideas stand in for the factor itself, not to mention in the event that they (are handled as having) develop into the factor. One might discover a phrase or idea that describes a specific livedness so very nicely that it turns into part of one’s core vocabulary. With use, nonetheless, it's attainable that the phrase/idea loses its efficiency (in invoking a livedness) and—in its employment—feels empty and compelled, even. Or, maybe its detachment (from expertise) turns into invisible, and one begins dwelling it as a type of ‘truth’, disabling one from seeing the livednesses in different descriptions. That is possible why French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty says that the phenomenologist should stay a “perpetual beginner”, one who should all the time return to lived expertise. They have to all the time be in contact with expertise itself, prepared and prepared to half with their phrases or ideas or pondering if the latter not embrace a livedness.

The phenomenologist should themselves carry out phenomenologies of their very own phenomenologizing in an effort to see exactly how their very own phrases/ideas perform; nobody can do that for them. Are these phrases/ideas referring to a livedness? The phenomenologist should at every flip start in the beginning, so to talk, lest their descriptions develop into lifeless and flat or far too injected with reflection or principle (and so extra intellectually satisfying than phenomenologically so). There's a distinction between being principally glad with an outline (“it works”) and being utterly taken with one (“yes, that’s the one!”). When one’s core vocabulary not does the latter, it might be an indication that one has been led astray from lived expertise itself. And one should all the time reside with the attention that even one’s core vocabulary exists solely to be seen via, lest one be unable to see the livedness contained in different descriptions.

One thing comparable may very well be mentioned about studying phenomenological descriptions. In a way, this is more difficult as a result of it forces you to be open to phrases being utilized in methods by which you aren't accustomed to seeing, which entails analyzing your personal relationships with sure phrases (and perhaps loosening the grip that your understanding has on sure phrases and/or relationships between phrases). The idea, keep in mind, isn't what we try to grasp. The effectiveness of a phenomenological textual content (together with the article you might be studying) relies upon largely on the reader’s willingness to spend the time to ‘access’ (experientially) the livednesses to which the writer is referring, and never simply critically consider/study the phrases/ideas themselves.

That is why phenomenologists have traditionally employed numerous means—other than propositional discourse—of speaking lived experiences: instance or anecdote, expressive imagery or narrative, poetry, poetising, et cetera. Phenomenologists have additionally borrowed from novels, poetry, legendary and non secular texts. That is all executed in an try to evoke or revoke [as in ‘call back’] or re-call a lived expertise, to make accessible a sure pathos—one not readily given to the logic of propositional discourse (or of abstract or paraphrase on the whole). What's most necessary isn't the strategy; it's not the case that one should use an anecdote or instance in an effort to ‘do’ phenomenology. The particular means by which we reanimate some expertise is secondary. We let the expertise itself be our information; in a considerably unusual flip of phrase, we let the expertise itself inform us find out how to describe it, and in so doing we stay open to the expressive modes exterior of conventional propositional discourse.

The usual for evaluating phenomenological description is whether or not or not the outline resonates with the dwelling sense of an expertise. description will resonate with the dwelling sense of an expertise in such a manner that the reader will have the ability to acknowledge her or his expertise in that description; certainly, it would “spark” that have within the reader. Additional, this description will draw the reader’s consideration to one thing in that have that he or she had not previously seen. What's necessary to recognise is that there aren't any impartial standards for the precise development of the outline. Phenomenological description doesn't require something particular: a selected verb tense (as in ‘only present continuous’, and so on.) or particular narrative type (solely prose, no poetry, or solely prose and poetry, no fiction, and so on.), tone (as in it should be idiomatic, prolix, poetic, and so on.), et cetera. The outline itself is guided by—written by, in a way—the experiencing itself.


After all, the phrases now we have at our disposal are inheritances, and are able to doing violence to our personal lived actuality. As inheritances, they're historic, conventional. This by itself isn't an issue. The issue is when they're disconnected from lived expertise, when they're handled as (goal) ‘reality’—as the best way issues are and as last—and so not understood as traditionally (and so politically and culturally) ‘constituted’. This disconnection can also be a violence, and the phenomenologist—who should perpetually remind him/herself to return to expertise, who should perpetually overlook—capabilities as an necessary agent of change insofar as their solely loyalty is to lived expertise itself.

Phenomenology, most principally, provides voice to a livedness, a givenness as given. First, because of this it provides voice to an unfolding, a course of, a fluidity, an ever-changing, impermanent—and so it's by no means ‘complete’. Second, because of this the phenomenologist treats all phenomena as given and never as reflective of an goal actuality and/or some ‘hierarchy’ therein (by which some issues are objectively/“really” extra ‘real’ and others much less so). In brief, it provides voice not to what is extra actual and fewer actual, appropriate and incorrect, regular and irregular, good and dangerous, and so on., however what's given as roughly actual, appropriate or incorrect, regular or irregular, good or dangerous, et cetera. Lastly, because of this phenomenology is inherently essential, exactly due to its loyalty to lived expertise. In different phrases, it questions our present methods of seeing, pondering, feeling, doing, and being. It uncovers norms—inclusions/exclusions/occlusions—presuppositions, recurring methods of perceiving/pondering/feeling/doing/being, that have been hitherto tucked away, constituting our expertise. It permits (and even encourages) us to see (or re-see or un-see) each number of experiencing in a transformative manner, permitting us to re-think and re-configure the ideas we generally make use of to interpret expertise. And it additionally provides us a brand new manner of participating with non-phenomenological works, opening us as much as the ways in which lived expertise might have motivated the development of classes/phrases/philosophies? Lastly, phenomenology’s criticality signifies that it doesn't spare itself—it's self-critical:

Phenomenology continues to make us conscious to be critically and philosophically conscious of how our lives (and our cognitive, emotional, embodied, and tacit understandings) are socially, culturally, politically, and existentially common. However phenomenology additionally reminds us that these constructions themselves are all the time at risk of changing into imperatives, rationalities, epistemologies, and ontologies that must be bracketed, deconstructed, and substituted with extra reflective portrayals.

– Max van Manen, Phenomenology of Apply (13).


The best way most of us (more often than not) consider “truth” includes an identical up of our phrases or ideas with some factor/state of affairs “in the world” (an incidence, a state of being, and so on.). Each are (and should be) mounted. The phrase/idea should imply one thing particular sufficient to have the ability to peg it to the factor on the planet; then we’re capable of see if the outline is appropriate—if it’s the reality. Is the factor on the planet trustworthy to our phrase/idea/description? To make this evaluation we should be in possession of each of the phrase/idea and the factor on the planet in an effort to decide whether or not or not they match up. And to be in possession of each signifies that each are mounted sufficient to have the ability to make any type of equivalence. They each should, in different phrases, possess some type of determinate and stuck essence in order that the matter of reality may be settled/rectified. This quantities to one thing like the appliance of a way to the product of reflective consciousness (i.e., after lived expertise has been interpretively mounted). Nonetheless, the kinds of claims that meet this normal—what we'd readily describe as being “correct”—don't reach apprehending precise lived experiencing.

These mounted essences, nonetheless, are spinoff of a extra primordial means of experiencing; our mounted concept of “x” is spinoff of our many lived experiencings of “x”. Extra particularly, we are able to merely say that I by no means encounter “x” exterior of context. I by no means encounter a person factor in splendid isolation. Much more primordially, nonetheless, there's expertise as such, showing as such. This most simple taking place of expertise—the singular factor ”inside” which each and every particular person factor may be mentioned to happen—it's not topic to my will. I didn’t create it. I can’t flip it off. It’s not non-compulsory. It's—as we mentioned above—given. It's self-given; I do nothing to protect/keep it. And it exhibits itself. And the impartial, mounted (reflective) classes that we make use of to pronounce on reality/falsity relaxation on this self-given experiencing that's all the time already taking place. We are able to describe this as showing/expertise/existence as such. It's this background, always-already-there taking place of expertise is what phenomenology desires to contact and describe. And in making contact with the bottom of our information, we are able to see the norms, rules, presuppositions, and so on. concerned in the best way we’ve established the phrases into which we translate expertise.

It's not the case that these two issues—mounted ideas and the extra unique self-given showing of expertise on the whole—are opposed to one another. Moderately, the fundamental, background steady self-happening of experiencing is what permits us to see issues that stand nonetheless, such because the “facts”, our rules of goal “truth”. (After all, my capacity to see issues stand nonetheless is additionally a function of this self-givenness.)

Phenomenological ‘knowledge’, then, consists of conclusions about experiencing primarily based on correct phenomenological descriptions. This type of data—phenomenological data—considerations the expertise of some phenomenon or, alternatively, the kind or construction of some expertise (e.g., consuming wine, jealousy, notion, being a gendered/raced physique, sickness, struggling, enjoying music, incapacity, romantic love, time, surprise, existence/being, and so on.). What is supposed by ‘form’ or ‘structure’ can also be a (phenomenological) description of one thing like the overall high quality of an expertise that permits it to be recognised as a selected type of expertise (e.g., consuming wine, jealousy, and so on.). You will need to word that “form” or “structure” don't confer with some goal, metaphysical construction/substance that organises sensation or something comparable. What's given in precise, lived expertise is rarely the factor in its entirety (by no means, for instance, embodiment as such), and so our descriptions are by no means ‘final’ in any manner. Phenomenological description is extra about establishing an openness to have interaction with expertise than it's about dis-covering mounted/goal realities/essences or one thing like metaphysical substance.

Partially two of this text we’ll discover in additional element find out how to do phenomenology.

Additional Studying

On the subject of ‘lived experience’, Gadamer’s in depth dialogue of ‘Erlebnis in Reality & Methodology is instructive (53-61). See additionally Wilhelm Dilthey’s ‘Goethe and the Poetic Imagination’, in Poetry & Expertise (223); Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Notion, xvi-xvii. Max van Manen additionally emphasizes ‘immediacy’: lived expertise “…is what presents itself directly and immediately” as if unmediated by thought/language/picture, and so on., as apodeictic. Edmund Husserl famously used the phrase “natural attitude” to explain our on a regular basis lived expertise, our ‘embeddedness’ within the apodeicticity of quotidian life. He supplies a helpful description of this primary angle in the primary guide of his Concepts Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to A Phenomenological Philosophy (51).

On the subject of the ‘call and response’ construction of expertise, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s dialogue within the third chapter of the introduction to his Phenomenology of Notion (28-51).

For extra on the subject of the ‘object’/state of affairs constituting the topic’s expertise, see Jean-Louis Chretien’s The Name and the Response and Gunter Figal’s Objectivity: The Hermeneutical and Philosophy. Peter-Paul Verbeek (following Bruno Latour), provides objects specific primacy in his What Issues Do (99-104, 113-9). In an article on Edmund Husserl (entitled ‘Edmund Husserl’), Dermot Moran, argues that this orientation may be present in Husserl’s notion of ‘motivation’ (32).

On the subject of how ’naming one thing destroys it’, see Maurice Blanchot’s dialogue in his article ‘Literature & The Right to Death’ is related (300-344). See additionally Sartre’s dialogue of King Midas in The Imaginary. A Phenomenological Psychology of the Creativeness (175). Emmanuel Levinas says in his Totality and Infinity (45-6)—“[neutralizing] it… in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same” (45-46). Additionally see Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Group (9-12), and his lecture ‘What is a Paradigm?’. Additionally see Gunter Figal’s Objectivity: The Hermeneutical and Philosophy (29-30). Hegel—in System of Moral Life and First Philosophy of Spirit—mentioned one thing comparable: “The first act, by which Adam established his lordship over the animals, is this, that he gave them a name, i.e., he nullified them as beings on their own account, and made them into ideal [entities]” (221-2).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes that the phenomenologist should stay a “perpetual beginner” in his introduction (lxxviii).

On the subject of the criticality of phenomenology, that is the fundamental thrust of Michael Marder’s 2014 guide, Phenoma-Critique-Logos, subtitled The Venture of Important Phenomenology, in addition to Mark Vagle’s 2014 textual content Crafting Phenomenological Analysis (see 109-46). A lot of texts in essential phenomenology have been revealed lately. See 50 Ideas for a Important Phenomenology.

On the subject of ‘truth’ in phenomenology, see Martin Heiddegger’s Parmenides. On the notion of ‘truth’ in each Husserl and Heidegger, see Thane Naberhaus’s article ’Reality’.

Works Cited

This text is a revised extraction of the primary chapter of “Doing Phenomenology”, a Masters thesis written by Balraj. It was submitted to the College of Guelph (Canada) and revealed in 2016.

  1. Agamben, Giorgio. 2002. “What is a Paradigm?” European Graduate College lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Wxn1L9Er0.

  2. ———. 1993 [1990]. The Coming Group. [Trans.: It.: Hardt, 1993]. Minnesota.

  3. Blanchot, Maurice. 1995 [1948]. Literature & The Right to Death’, in The Work of Hearth. [Trans. Fr.: Mandell]. Stanford. 300-344.

  4. Chretien, Jean-Louis. 2004 [1992]. The Name and the Response. [Trans. Fr.: Davenport, 2004]. Fordham.

  5. Derrida, Jacques. 1982 [1971]. ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’, in Margins of Philosophy. [Trans, Fr.: Bass]. Chicago. 207-271.

  6. Figal, Gunter. 2010 [2006]. Objectivity: The Hermeneutical and Philosophy. [Trans. Fr.: George]. SUNY.

  7. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2004 [1960]. Reality & Methodology. [Rev. Trans. De.: Weinsheimer & Marshall]. Continuum (UK).

  8. Hegel, G.W.F.. 1979 [1802-4]. System of Moral Life and First Philosophy of Spirit. [Trans. De.: Harris & Knox]. SUNY.

  9. Heidegger, Martin. 1992 [1982]. Parmenides. [Trans. De.: Schuwer & Rojcewicz]. Indiana.

  10. Husserl, Edmund. 1983 [1913]. Concepts Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to A Phenomenological Philosophy. First E-book: Common Introduction to A Pure Phenomenology. [Trans. De.: Kersten]. Martinus Nijhoff.

  11. Ihde, Don. 2012 [1977]. Experimental Phenomenology. Second Version: Multistabilities. SUNY.

  12. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1979 [1961]. Totality & Infinity. [Trans., Fr.: Lingis, A., 1969]. Martinus Nijhoff.

  13. Marder, Michael. 2014. Phenoma-Critique-Logos: The Venture of Important Phenomenology. Roman & Littlefield.

  14. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2012 [1945]. Phenomenology of Notion. [Trans., Fr.: Landes, D., 2012]. Routledge.

  15. Moran, Dermot. 2012. ‘Edmund Husserl’, in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology (eds. Luft & Overgaard). Routledge. 28-39.

  16. Naberhaus, Thane. 2012. ‘Truth’, in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology (eds. Luft & Overgaard). Routledge. 158-167.

  17. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956 [1943]. Being & Nothingness. [Trans., Fr.: Barnes, 1956.] Washington Sq. Press.

  18. ———. 2010 [1940]. The Imaginary. A Phenomenological Psychology of the Creativeness. Routledge.

  19. Smith, Joel. 2016. Experiencing Phenomenology. An Introduction. Routledge.

  20. Vagle, Mark. 2014. Crafting Phenomenological Analysis. Left Coast.

  21. van Manen, Max. 2014. Phenomenology of Apply: That means-Giving Strategies in Phenomenological Analysis & Writing. Left Coast Press.

  22. Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2005 [2000]. What Issues Do. [Trans. Nl.: Crease, 2005]. Penn State.

  23. Weiss, G., Ann Murphy, & Gayle Salamon (eds.). 2019. 50 Ideas for a Important Phenomenology. Northwestern.

Obtain This Article

A pdf of this text may be downloaded by way of Google Drive, Issuu, and/or DeviantArt. Please word that probably the most up-to-date model of this text will probably be out there right here at balraj.yoga.


You can view the original post here

Leave a Comment