Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9, 2024
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, and George Barros
October 9, 2024, 12:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly really helpful for utilizing this data-heavy software.
Click here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Note: The information cut-off for this product was 10:20am ET on October 9 and covers each October 8 and 9 as a consequence of the truth that ISW didn't publish a marketing campaign evaluation on October 8. ISW will cowl subsequent studies within the October 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian navy command has probably ordered Russian forces to conduct a comparatively excessive tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue vital tactical advances earlier than muddy floor situations in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor climate situations in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will probably complicate and constrain each mechanized and infantry maneuver, however Russian forces could search to take care of their constant offensive stress in japanese Ukraine regardless of these difficulties. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk acknowledged on October 8 that Russian forces are rising their use of armored autos on the battlefield — particularly within the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk instructions — so as to take benefit of dry highway and terrain situations earlier than wet seasonal climate causes muddy grounds situations.[1] Russian forces have been conducting a excessive tempo of mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since late July 2024 and have carried out at the very least 4 noticed battalion-sized mechanized assaults in japanese Ukraine since July 25, 2024.[2] Russian forces have additionally resumed comparatively giant mechanized assaults alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since late September 2024.[3] The Russian navy command probably goals for intensified mechanized offensive exercise to permit Russian forces to advance throughout open fields and consolidate in close by frontline settlements that Russian forces can then use as a foothold for staging and launching offensive operations that search to realize operational targets — such because the seizure of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast or the seizure of Pokrovsk.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 9 that muddy seasonal situations have already began in Kursk Oblast and are constraining maneuver for wheeled autos.[5] ISW has not but noticed broad reporting that muddy terrain is constraining mechanized maneuver on any sector of the entrance in Kursk Oblast or in Ukraine, nevertheless.
Fall climate situations may also probably constrain Russian infantry maneuver, and the Russian navy command probably hopes that mechanized advances that Russian forces can obtain now will restrict the quantity of open fields that Russian infantry must cross after climate situations deteriorate. Russian forces have relied on small infantry teams to advance below the concealment of windbreaks in open fields from settlement to settlement, notably within the Pokrovsk course.[6] Fall climate will trigger many windbreaks comprised of deciduous timber to lose most of their foliage and can present much less concealment for Russian infantry teams throughout fall 2024 and winter 2024-2025 — leaving Russian squaddies extra weak to pervasive Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and tactical fires.
Russian forces will probably not stop offensive operations following the autumn mud season, although antagonistic climate situations will probably degrade Russian infantry effectiveness. Russian forces made a concerted effort to regain the theater-wide initiative in the course of the interval of probably the most tough climate situations for mechanized offensive operations in fall 2023, nevertheless, and will search to retain the theater-wide initiative although constant offensive stress in fall 2024 below comparable climate situations.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian navy command are pursuing a method that goals to stop Ukraine from accumulating manpower and materiel to contest the theater-wide initiative by sustaining constant offensive stress on Ukrainian forces all through the frontline and can probably proceed to pursue this technique regardless of seasonal constraints on mechanized and infantry maneuver.[8] Russian forces have exhausted many of the reserves that they established for his or her intensified Summer 2024 offensive operation that has closely centered on advancing in Donetsk Oblast, and ISW continues to evaluate that the continuing Russian offensive operation will probably culminate throughout the coming months.[9] Poor climate situations that constrain battlefield maneuver will probably contribute to end result, however the end result of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation is not going to essentially lead to an entire finish of constant Russian offensive operations all through japanese Ukraine in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025. Russian forces have a longtime sample of combating past their end result factors in addition to combating via antagonistic climate situations.
US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly acknowledged that the United States is withholding a number of US weapon methods and different navy communications networks from Ukraine that might assist Ukraine's battle effort. CNN reported on October 8, citing sources acquainted with the state of affairs, that Cavoli outlined an inventory of a number of US capabilities that might higher assist Ukraine's battle effort in a September 2024 report back to the US Congress.[10] Another supply acquainted with the matter advised CNN that that the checklist included the air-launched Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSMs) cruise missile and the Link 16 system – a knowledge sharing community that the United States and different NATO international locations use for communication and command and management (C2). CNN reported that Cavoli's report doesn't clarify why the US has not but supplied Ukraine with methods that the United States assesses may assist Ukraine's battle effort. An unspecified supply advised CNN that the United States has probably avoided offering Ukraine with the Link 16 system over operational safety issues.
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun acknowledged on October 8 {that a} restricted quantity of North Korean navy personnel are probably working close to occupied Donetsk City.[11] Kim acknowledged that North Korea probably deployed a number of navy personnel to Ukraine to assist Russia's battle effort in response to a report {that a} Ukrainian missile strike close to occupied Donetsk City killed a number of North Korean navy officers on October 3.[12] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, acknowledged on October 5 {that a} small quantity of North Korean navy personnel, primarily engineering personnel, are working in occupied Donetsk Oblast and are repairing or someway bettering the standard of a big quantity of low-quality ammunition that North Korea supplied to the Russian navy.[13]
Russian unlawful arms seller and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped dealer a deal for Russia to promote arms value $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid rising studies of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 7, citing a European safety official and different sources acquainted with the matter, that Bout assisted in negotiations for small arms gross sales value $10 million when a Houthi delegation visited Moscow in August 2024.[14] The WSJ's sources acknowledged that the primary two deliveries would consist of largely AK-74 assault rifles and that the Houthis additionally mentioned the potential switch of Kornet antitank missiles and anti-air weapons. The sources acknowledged that they had been not sure whether or not Bout negotiated the deal on behalf of the Kremlin or simply with the Kremlin's tacit approval, and the WSJ famous that the switch has not but occurred and the supply of the arms continues to be unclear.[15] The WSJ reported that these deliveries may start as quickly as October 2024 to Hodeidah Port below the guise of meals provides. Both Bout and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the WSJ report.[16] Russia has reportedly been concerned in Iranian-brokered “secret talks” to switch Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles and different navy tools to the Houthis, however it's unclear whether or not these transfers have or will happen.[17] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia probably goals to leverage Iranian proxies to not directly confront the West and form Western resolution making, notably to discourage the West from supporting Ukraine over fears of Russian escalation towards the West, together with escalating in a unique theater.[18]
Russia banned the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, probably degrading some frontline Russian forces' ad-hoc communications within the close to time period. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor introduced on October 8 that it had banned Discord inside Russia on October 8 following current Russian fines towards Discord for failing to adjust to Russian censorship legal guidelines.[19] Some frontline Russian forces use Discord for coordinating operations, together with fight drone operations, and this ban will probably impede some Russian navy communications on the frontline within the close to time period.[20] The Kremlin has just lately carried out a number of measures which have threatened frontline ad-hoc communication methods, together with limiting the use of private digital gadgets on the frontline, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to determine a safe and efficient official communications system for Russian forces to make use of as an alternative.[21] Some Russian milbloggers responded to the Discord ban by reiterating complaints concerning the lack of enough various communications methods for Russian forces on the frontline.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that the Russian MoD has failed to handle this challenge for the previous three years however claimed that Russian forces have been in a position to make use of different communications companies to coordinate fight operations efficiently.[23]
Russian forces proceed to make use of chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued obvious violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a celebration. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported on October 8 that Russian forces proceed to make use of Okay-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing dangerous however not essentially deadly riot management brokers (RCA), that are prohibited in fight by the CWC.[24] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that there have been 250 circumstances of Russian forces utilizing munitions containing unknown varieties of harmful chemical brokers in Ukraine in September 2024. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that Russian chemical weapons use has been systematic since February 2023 and that as of September 24 Ukraine has recorded Russian forces utilizing munitions geared up with chemical weapons 4,228 instances. ISW has persistently reported on more and more widespread cases of Russian forces utilizing chemical substances in fight which can be banned by the CWC.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian navy command has probably ordered Russian forces to conduct a comparatively excessive tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue vital tactical advances earlier than muddy floor situations in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor climate situations in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will probably complicate and constrain each mechanized and infantry maneuver, however Russian forces could search to take care of their constant offensive stress in japanese Ukraine regardless of these difficulties.
- US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly acknowledged that the United States is withholding a number of US weapon methods and different navy communications networks from Ukraine that might assist Ukraine's battle effort.
- South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun acknowledged on October 8 {that a} restricted quantity of North Korean navy personnel are probably working close to occupied Donetsk City.
- Russian unlawful arms seller and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped dealer a deal for Russia to promote arms value $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid rising studies of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation.
- Russia banned partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, probably degrading some frontline Russian forces' ad-hoc communications within the close to time period.
- Russian forces proceed to make use of chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued obvious violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a celebration.
- Russian forces just lately superior close to Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Robotyne.
- Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev acknowledged on October 8 that Russian forces could have exhausted their preexisting shares of aerial bombs for glide bomb strikes.
We don't report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don't straight have an effect on the navy operations we're assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to judge and report on the consequences of these prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity though we don't describe them in these studies.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate predominant efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued assaults in Glushkovsky Raion west of the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9 however didn't make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out floor assaults close to Veseloye (south of Glushkovo).[26] Russian sources, together with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces carried out offensive operations close to Novy Put on October 9.[27] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade and 56th VDV Regiment (seventh VDV Division) reportedly proceed working in Glushkovsky Raion.[28]
Ukrainian forces continued assaults in the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued floor assaults east of Korenevo close to Olgovka; southeast of Korenevo close to Lyubimovka and Plekhovo; and northeast of Sudzha close to Russkoye Porechnoye, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, and Marynovka on October 7, 8, and 9.[29]
Russian forces reportedly just lately superior in the primary Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued combating within the space on October 7, 8, and 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 9 that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha) and Pokrovsky (southeast of Korenevo).[30] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that parts of the Russian 106th VDV Division have seized over half of Lyubimovka.[31] ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of these claims, nevertheless. Russian forces reportedly attacked close to Daryino (southeast of Korenevo), Lyubimovka, and Plekhovo.[32]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 7 that it efficiently disabled the Russian Baltic Fleet's Alexandrit-class (Project 12700) Alexander Obukhov minesweeper whereas it was docked in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast.[33] The GUR reported {that a} profitable operation created a gap within the Alexander Obukhov's fuel pipe inflicting water to seep into the engine and severely broken it earlier than the vessel's scheduled sortie. The GUR famous that the Russian navy is repairing the Alexander Obukhov.
Ukrainian navy authorities reported on October 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile and storage ammunition storage facility in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast.[34] Ukrainian navy officers acknowledged that the ability shops glide bombs, missile and artillery methods, and North Korean- and Iranian-provided weapons. Geolocated footage printed on October 9 exhibits a fireplace and secondary detonations close to Karachev.[35] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces downed 24 Ukrainian drones over Bryansk Oblast on the evening of October 8 to 9.[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces just lately superior inside Vovchansk amid continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9. Geolocated footage printed on October 7 displaying a Russian soldier elevating a Russian flag in a constructing on the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant signifies that Russian forces probably recaptured the plant.[37] Russian forces continued floor assaults northeast of Kharkiv City close to Vovchansk and Starytsya on October 7, 8, and 9.[38] A Ukrainian officer working within the Kharkiv course acknowledged on October 7 that Russian forces are constructing elongated trenches in deep ravines and aid streams which can be more durable to clear in addition to interconnected tunnels.[39] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev acknowledged on October 8 that Russian forces have transferred particular engineering models to the Kharkiv course to construct underground communication and logistics routes.[40] Sarantsev added that Russian aviation is intensifying glide bomb strikes within the Kharkiv course and that Russian forces conduct three to 4 glide bomb strikes within the space per week.[41] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on October 8 that parts of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (forty seventh Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD] are working close to Lukyantsi (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces just lately superior northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 8 and 9. Geolocated footage printed on October 7 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior southward alongside the O-131306 freeway southeast of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[43] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka; east of Kupyansk close to Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Kruhlyakivka, Novoosynove, Stepova Novoselivka, and Lozova; west of Svatove close to Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove close to Novovodyane; northwest of Kreminna close to Novosadove, Makiivka, Nevske, Druzhelyubivka, and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna close to Torske; south of Kreminna close to the Serebryanske forest space; and southwest of Kreminna close to Dibrova on October 7, 8 and 9.[44] Elements of the Russian ”Uday” drone detachment are reportedly working within the Kupyansk course.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces just lately superior close to Siversk amid continued Russian offensive operations within the space on October 7, 8, and 9. Geolocated footage printed on October 7 and eight signifies that Russian forces just lately superior east of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and into western Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), indicating that Russian forces have probably seized Verkhnokamyanske.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that parts of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Combined Arms Army [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC] seized Hryhorivka and Serebryanka (north of Siversk) and that Russian forces additionally superior north of Verkhnokamyanske and Sprine (southeast of Siversk).[47] ISW has not noticed affirmation of these claims, nevertheless. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasya Bobovnikova acknowledged on October 7 that Russian forces are utilizing bikes and restricted numbers of Soviet-era armored autos and tanks throughout assaults within the Siversk course.[48] Russian forces continued assaults southeast of Siversk close to Ivano-Darivka and Spirne on October 7, 8, and 9.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar on October 7, 8, and 9, however there have been no confirmed adjustments to the frontline on this space. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior additional inside Zhovtnevyi Microraion in Chasiv Yar itself, however ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare.[50] Russian forces continued assaults north of Chasiv Yar close to Mynkivka and Kalynivka; in Chasiv Yar itself; and south of Chasiv Year close to Stupochky, Bila Hora, and within the course of Oleksandro-Shultyne on October 7, 8, and 9.[51] Drone operators of the Russian “Burevestnik” volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[52]
Russian forces just lately superior in southern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations within the space on October 7, 8, and 9. Geolocated footage printed on October 8 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside Heroiv Pratsi Street in japanese Toretsk and alongside Peremohy and Konstytutsyi streets in southern Toretsk.[53] Bobovnikova acknowledged on October 7 that Russian forces have entered the japanese outskirts of Toretsk and superior alongside Tsentralna Street within the course of the Tsentralna Mine.[54] Bobovnikova acknowledged that Russian forces are attacking in small squad-sized teams of three-to-five personnel within the space and famous that unspecified Russian Spetsnaz forces (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are working inside Toretsk.[55] Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk acknowledged on October 8 that Russian forces are sometimes utilizing armored autos throughout assaults close to Toretsk and are focusing on advancing into Toretsk from Niu York and Nelipivka (each south of Toretsk).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior additional inside central Toretsk and as much as the Tsentralna Mine, however ISW has not noticed affirmation of these claims.[57] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Toretsk close to Dyliivka; close to Toretsk itself; and south of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka, Nelipivka, Niu York, and Sukha Balka on October 7, 8, and 9.[58]
Ukrainian forces just lately superior throughout a counterattack east of Pokrovsk and Russian forces just lately superior southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage printed on October 8 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior into northwestern Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk and west of Hrodivka).[59] Geolocated footage printed on October 8 signifies that Russian forces superior north of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and marginally superior in central Zhelanne Pershe (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 8 that Russian forces seized Zoryane Pershe (probably referring to the satellite tv for pc neighborhood of Zoryane), however ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces working southeast of Pokrovsk additionally superior west of Novohrodivka, west of Tsukuryne, south of Zhelanne Druhe, and west of Nevelske.[62] ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of these claims, nevertheless. Muzychuk acknowledged on October 9 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance teams are demining positions, conducting reconnaissance, and organising statement posts close to Selydove in preparation for future Russian assaults towards the settlement.[63] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk close to Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, Promin, Mykolaivka, Krutyi Yar, Sukhyi Yar, and Lysivka and southeast of Pokrovsk close to Novohrodivka, Mykolaivka, Selydove, Kalynove, Novoselydivka, Tsukuryne, and Hirnyk on October 7, 8, and 9.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City close to Maksymilyanivka, Heorhiivka, Hostre, Kurakhivka, and Kurakhove on October 7, 8, and 9.[65] A Ukrainian brigade working within the Kurakhove course (west and southwest of Donetsk City) posted footage on October 8 displaying Ukrainian forces repelling a company-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified space of this course and reported that Ukrainian forces broken 4 armored autos.[66] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly working within the southern Donetsk course (west and southwest of Donetsk City).[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 9 and reportedly just lately superior. Russian sources, together with the Russian MoD, claimed that parts of the fifth Tank Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zolota Nyva on October 8 and consolidated a foothold throughout the settlement as of October 9.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 8 that Russian forces superior instantly north of Vuhledar.[69] ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of these claims, nevertheless. Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Kostyantynivka, Katerynivka, Antonivka, Vodyane, Vuhledar, Bohoyavlenka, and Zolota Nyva on October 7, 8, and 9.[70] Elements of the thirty sixth Motorized Rifle Brigade (29 CAA, EMD) are reportedly working close to Vuhledar and Bohoyavlenka.[71]
Russian and Ukrainian sources didn't report any combating within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on October 7, 8, and 9.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces just lately marginally superior south of Stepnohirsk amid continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9. Geolocated footage printed on October 8 signifies that Russian forces just lately marginally superior in southwestern Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk).[72] Russian milbloggers famous that Russian forces keep positions in Kamyanske and claimed that Russian forces are advancing additional into central Kamyanske.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian forty ninth Special Airborne Brigade (a newly fashioned brigade that's reportedly subordinated to the 58th CAA) supported the current Russian assault into Kamyanske.[74] Russian forces additionally attacked close to Robotyne and northwest of Robotyne within the course of Novodanylivka on October 8 and 9.[75] Elements of the Russian twenty second Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working close to Kamyanske and artillery models of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (nineteenth Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working within the Zaporizhia course.[76]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Kherson course on October 7, 8, and 9, however there have been no confirmed adjustments to the frontline on this course.[77] A Russian milblogger amplified claims that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces should not have sufficient boats or correct coaching to conduct profitable assaults onto the islands within the Dnipro River.[78] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly working within the Kherson course.[79]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a sequence of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on the evening of October 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 9 that Russian forces launched three Iskander M/KH-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 22 unspecified drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones over Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Kyiv oblasts and that one drone returned to Russian airspace. Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov acknowledged on October 9 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City twice with glide bombs. [81] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on October 8 and 9 that Russian Shahed drones prompted a fireplace at a multi-story condominium in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and that Russian drones struck a nine-story constructing in Odesa City.[82]
Russian forces carried out a sequence of missile and drone strikes towards Ukraine on October 7 and eight. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 8 that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles launched from occupied Crimea and focused Ukrainian territory with 19 assault drones launched from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 18 drones in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Ternopil Oblasts whereas diverting one assault drone to Russia. Ukrainian officers reported on October 7 that Russian forces struck a civilian Palau-flagged ship in Odesa's port with a ballistic missile.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 8 that Russian forces launched missile strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa City and Ilychesk and claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces who had been loading ships with provides for Ukrainian troopers.[85] Ukrainian officers reported on October 8 that Russian forces struck a high-rise constructing and a faculty in Kostyantynivka with three KAB-250 glide bombs, Kharkiv Oblast with 11 glide bombs, and a civilian enterprise constructing in Kharkiv City with a number of unspecified missiles.[86] Head of the Kherson City Military Administration Roman Marchko acknowledged on October 7 that Russian forces launched airstrikes on Kherson City utilizing 4 glide bombs.[87] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 7 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot close to Osoyivka, Sumy Oblast with an unspecified missile.[88]
Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on October 8 that an unknown air goal flew into Ukraine from Belarus on the morning of October 8.[89]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian goal: Expand fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev acknowledged on October 8 that Russian forces could have exhausted their preexisting shares of aerial bombs for glide bomb strikes.[90] Sarantsev acknowledged that Russian forces have intensified their glide bomb strikes by such a level that Russian forces at the moment are fielding aerial bombs that Russia has produced solely a number of days in the past in September 2024. Sarantsev acknowledged that this means that Russian forces at the moment are relying on logistics to carry newly-produced bombs to Russian airfields.[91] ISW has beforehand noticed Ukrainian forces putting Russian ammunition warehouses holding glide bombs.[92] ISW continues to evaluate that continued Ukrainian strikes towards rear Russian logistics services inside Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian navy, together with forcing the Russian navy command to reorganize and disperse assist and logistics methods inside Russia to mitigate the affect of such strikes.[93]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced on October 8 that Russian and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) warships carried out joint patrols and anti-submarine workouts within the northwestern Pacific Ocean following the conclusion of the “Beibu/Interaction-2024” navy workouts.[94]
The Russian MoD posted footage on October 8 of Russian forces fielding D-74 122mm artillery weapons, which Soviet forces first fielded in 1956, close to Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast.[95] Ukrainian military-focused information outlet Militarnyi reported that Russian forces have a small amount of D-74s after Soviet forces exported most of these methods from their shares within the Sixties and Nineteen Seventies and that the North Korean, Vietnamese, PLA, and Algerian militaries nonetheless area these methods.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that many of these international locations have mastered serial manufacturing of D-74 weapons and ammunition, implying that Russia could search to obtain extra methods, spare elements, or ammunition from these international locations for its remaining D-74 weapons.[97]
Russian state protection conglomerate Rostec introduced on October 8 and 9 that its subsidiaries delivered new batches of unspecified portions of Russian BMP-3 and BDM-4M infantry combating autos (IFVs) and Su-34 bomber jets to the Russian MoD.[98] Rostec reported that its subsidiary Kurganmashzavod elevated manufacturing of the IFVs by 20 p.c from January to September 2024 in comparison with January to September 2023.[99]
Russian State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva visited a Russian Southern Military District (SMD) navy hospital and met with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast on October 8 as half of the Russian MoD's continued efforts to posture itself as offering efficient and bettering medical care to Russian troopers injured in Ukraine.[100]
The Russian Africa Corps introduced on October 9 that it opened a recruitment middle in St. Petersburg and marketed a regional one-time fee of 1.7 million rubles (about $17,494) for signing a contract with the Russian MoD along with the 400,000-ruble (about $4,116) federal one-time fee upon arrival at a navy unit.[101]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)
Nothing vital to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Develop its protection industrial base to turn into extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and worldwide companions)
ISW is suspending publishing protection of Ukrainian protection industrial efforts till additional discover.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance methods)
ISW just isn't publishing reporting on actions in Russian-occupied areas at present.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on October 8 obscure Russian threats of escalation as half of the Kremlin's reflexive management marketing campaign to discourage Western decisionmakers from permitting Ukraine to make use of Western-provided weapons towards navy targets in Russia.[102]
The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) held a heads of state assembly in Moscow on October 7 and eight and adopted a package deal of selections, together with a doc establishing the parameters of the Kremlin-promoted “Eurasian security architecture” and a decree aiming to determine a CIS “deradicalization” system.[103] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke at CIS conferences on October 8 and glorified the historic reminiscence of the Soviet Union's participation within the Second World War and accused Western states of supporting Nazism of their continued assist of Ukraine's protection.[104]
The Russian Investigative Committee, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and the Russian Embassy within the United Kingdom (UK) reiterated present Kremlin narratives accusing Ukraine of utilizing chemical weapons on the battlefield, prone to distract from Russia's personal documented use of chemical weapons in Ukraine.[105]
Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Belarus' a hundred and fortieth Repair Plant and 814th Maintenance Center could also be repairing and restoring armored autos for the Russian navy. Satellite imagery printed on October 3 exhibits over 60 tanks and 40 BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs) on the a hundred and fortieth Plant and extra APCs on the 814th Center.[106] These Belarusian facilities reportedly didn't beforehand have so many autos close by and that the autos' poor situations point out that Russian forces could have fielded these autos in battle.[107] ISW is unable to substantiate whether or not Russian forces have fielded these autos in battle in Ukraine.
Note: ISW doesn't obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these studies. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/vstygnuty-do-bagnyshha-na-shodi-vorog-aktyvizuvav-zastosuvannya-bronetehniky/
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090524
[5] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16866
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[10] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/08/politics/us-military-weapons-systems-ukraine/index.html
[11] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20241008004300315?part=nk/nk
[12] https://en.yna.co. dot kr/view/AEN20241008004300315?part=nk/nk ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024
[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521
[15] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521
[16] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024
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[20] https://t.me/milinfolive/131447; https://t.me/milinfolive/126841; https://t.me/rybar/64257; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/42510 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54690
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[22] https://t.me/rybar/64257; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/42510 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54690
[23] https://t.me/rybar/64257
[24] https://www.facebook.com/KSP.ZSU/posts/pfbid0zpQcHKFnrPV7zYYt7Fq1pd4nskvqjmbiYtBXgX33NMzQdo55sSNzXrdnceafspc4l?rdid=S2JLgfz25650RWKK ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/u-zsu-povidomyly-skilky-raziv-rosiya-vykorystovuvala-nebezpechni-himrechovyny/; https://suspilne dot media/853861-genstab-u-veresni-zafiksuvali-250-vipadkiv-zastosuvanna-himicnih-boepripasiv-proti-sil-oboroni/; https://www.telegraph.co dot uk/world-news/2024/04/06/russia-using-illegal-chemical-attacks-against-ukraine/
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023 ; ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024
[26] https://t.me/rybar/64258 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16866 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44314
[28] https://t.me/rusich_army/17572 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140040
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/44314 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17591 ; https://t.me/rybar/64258 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54630
[30] https://t.me/mod_russia/44314 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/278329
[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78429 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54630 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140146
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/44314 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78429
[33] https://gur.gov dot ua/content material/obukhov-zakhlynuvsia-cherhovyi-rosiiskyi-korabel-vyvedeno-z-ladu.html
[34] https://t.me/usf_army/193 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/syly-oborony-urazyly-vazhlyvu-vorozhu-czil-v-bryanskij-oblasti-rosiyi/ ; https://meduza dot io/information/2024/10/09/nad-regionami-rossii-za-noch-sbili-47-ukrainskih-bespilotnikov-v-bryanskoy-oblasti-atakovan-sklad ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hBSMrdaALSHRsRLyPPUQw7Mt8pPToS7QLQoVrjjRLWmJTycNJdS94HeqPXtPF7Wvl
[35] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1843990913263063338 ; https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1843902894480994747
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/44303
[37] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1843282581019901968; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/3159; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28455
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l
[39] https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/07/ryyut-navit-nigtyamy-okupanty-vrahovuyut-osoblyvosti-relyefu-na-harkivshhyni/
[40] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/pid-pokrovom-gruntu-rosiyany-obgovoryuyut-stvorennya-speczializovanyh-pidrozdiliv-kopachiv/
[41] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/kaby-z-kolis-koly-vygotovleni-aviabomby-yakymy-rosiyany-byut-po-harkivshhyni/
[42] https://t.me/otukharkiv/1919
[43] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1843523193124106425 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1843530459814171004; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/20968; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/170
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/54619
[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7058; https://t.me/izvestia/187819 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7061; https://t.me/zimenkin/2452
[47] tps://t.me/boris_rozhin/140161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://t.me/lost_armour/3558 ; https://t.me/zimenkin/2452 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28481 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16879
[48] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/07/vanok-ne-shkoda-rosiyany-atakuyut-v-rajoni-nyu-jorka-ta-chasovogo-yaru/
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl
[50] https://t.me/osintxryctik/252 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28459 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54630
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ; https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/07/vanok-ne-shkoda-rosiyany-atakuyut-v-rajoni-nyu-jorka-ta-chasovogo-yaru/ ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/22503
[53] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1843723203237343290; https://t.me/voron1OO/78 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7060; https://t.me/voron1OO/78; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1843725090812481984
[54] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/07/u-toreczku-tochatsya-boyi-za-kozhen-pidyizd-rosiyany-uvijshly-na-shidnu-okolyczyu-mista/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/853023-situacia-ne-stabilna-boi-za-kozen-pidizd-recnica-otu-lugansk-pro-situaciu-na-fronti/
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/vorog-prosunuvsya-u-toreczku-po-vulyczi-czentralnij-u-misti-tryvayut-zapekli-boyi/
[56] https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sproby-vorozhyh-vijsk-ohopyty-toreczk/
[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78378 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54630 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28478 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78436 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78458 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140120 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16873 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/278320
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ; https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/07/vanok-ne-shkoda-rosiyany-atakuyut-v-rajoni-nyu-jorka-ta-chasovogo-yaru/ ; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sproby-vorozhyh-vijsk-ohopyty-toreczk/ ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[59] https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1843715087623954728; https://t.me/skalabatalion/350
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7050; https://t.me/tass_agency/277979 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/20948; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/20571; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1843424878202097821; https://t.me/skalabatalion/344
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/44272
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/54630 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16775
[63] https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/vorozhi-dyversanty-pronykayut-u-tyl-syl-oborony-na-shodi-yakymy-ye-zavdannya-rosijskyh-drg/
[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/54630 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54632 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[66] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=527150899926003&rdid=BeqLgd7YE0dBCgPJ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/rota-okupantiv-z-posylennyam-shturmuvala-nashi-pozycziyi-desantnyky-pryvitaly-kremlivskogo-dyktatora/ ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14155
[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/11227
[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/44273 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16868 ; https://t.me/rybar/64232 ; https://t.me/rybar/64239 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54630 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11229 ; https://t.me/ChDambiev/31893
[69] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28462
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l ; https://t.me/rybar/64239 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16868 ; https://t.me/rybar/64239 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11230 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NTztAKG9GbWwHHNh83S8oA1wgwGdubqyCqwKRDPyHqs9eFy33pPT81K9ZXVEEmg1l
[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/11226 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11252
[72] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7054; https://t.me/ssternenko/34654
[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/140120 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/278255 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78442 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54707 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22517 ; https://t.me/rybar/64259 ; https://t.me/rybar/64229
[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78442
[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XkqjV3V419y1AeJ2YRqFVcSuG6zhqYp44sW5wVL5Rt2GkXtqb3jL1gJoifsWU93pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l
[76] https://t.me/motopatriot/28309 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/54618
[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FnjqJRLDS2jPvT816ESNNsDiXbRRdZDuogSHTNGDBnRQiK7Rq5bWprcSa4AXxrH2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xyP56iMbTVxY3RGxRSxBLJLohNsdAgVSgvEB4QQybW6yBN7QSAmsHaqipJ4K8Dohl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02p6tk9BSRkWXLwcvtZ6z7V3NZ1yaX46bGYQvNngk9ht5diuqPhviG4Bh5imS1PBZdl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02V576hahAt1hYPo2nsgFjMs6WMqh1eavgv9HHS9XLWQ5dHAYZ7kDoSG6RQe1WzYb1l
[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/54591
[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/54672
[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/20929
[81] https://t.me/synegubov/11542 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/kabamy-vdaryly-okupanty-po-harkivshhyni-v-oblasti-zagynuly-3-lyudyny/
[82] https://t.me/odeskaODA/6984 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/09/tretya-nich-teroru-odeshhyny-dronamy-poshkodzheno-fasady-bagatopoverhivok-ta-likarnyu/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/6973 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/chotyrygodynnyj-teror-odeshhyny-dronamy-u-chornomorsku-spalahnuly-try-poverhy-budynku/
[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/20874
[84] https://t.me/OleksiyKuleba/4957 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/armiya-rf-atakuvala-balistykoyu-czyvilne-sudno-v-portah-odeshhyny-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/6969; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/853013-armia-rf-skeruvala-na-odesu-balisticni-raketi-e-zagiblij-ta-patero-travmovanih/
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16792; https://t.me/rybar/64259
[86] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/29272 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/try-aviabomby-skynuv-vorog-na-kostyantynivku-ye-zagyblyj-i-poraneni/; https://t.me/synegubov/11529; https://t.me/synegubov/11532 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1784; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1776 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1777 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1778 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1779 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1781
[87] https://t.me/roman_mrochko/11770
[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/44250 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/78349 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/16770
[89] https://suspilne dot media/853327-povitrana-cil-z-bilorusi-zaletila-v-ukrainu-belaruski-gaun/; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8143
[90] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/kaby-z-kolis-koly-vygotovleni-aviabomby-yakymy-rosiyany-byut-po-harkivshhyni/
[91] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/08/kaby-z-kolis-koly-vygotovleni-aviabomby-yakymy-rosiyany-byut-po-harkivshhyni/
[92] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024
[93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms
[94] https://t.me/mod_russia/44260
[95] https://t.me/mod_russia/44271
[96] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/information/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-122-mm-garmaty-d-74-yaki-mogly-buty-peredani-inshymy-krayinamy/
[97] https://t.me/milinfolive/132387
[98] https://t.me/rostecru/8240; https://t.me/rostecru/8232
[99] https://t.me/rostecru/8232
[100] https://t.me/mod_russia/44285; https://t.me/mod_russia/44289; https://t.me/mod_russia/44290; https://t.me/mod_russia/44291
[101] https://t.me/KorpusAfrica/827
[102] https://t.me/tass_agency/278113
[103] http://kremlin dot ru/complement/6200; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46184 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46192
[104] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/transcripts/75290; http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/transcripts/75289
[105] https://t.me/tass_agency/277899; https://t.me/tass_agency/277902; https://t.me/tass_agency/277903; https://t.me/tass_agency/277906 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46191; https://t.me/tass_agency/278167
[106] https://x.com/a_from_s/status/1841932970502062474; https://t.me/mortisaeterna/8605
[107] https://x.com/a_from_s/status/1841932970502062474; https://t.me/mortisaeterna/8605
